[Inquiry] Re: Pure Symbols -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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PS.  Discussion Note 34

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AB = Auke van Breemen
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: PS-DIS 33.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/003223.html
In: PS-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/thread.html#3223

JA: So it is very difficult to imagine how the
    SA can be seen, prior to its interpretation
    one way or the other, as  being an icon.

AB: Since "prior to its interpretation" in the above sentence
    leaves open the possibility that in that case the SA must
    be seen as an 'sign in itself' only.  So, neither icon,
    nor index, or symbol.  I am not sure about your answer.

On the bare assumption that we are regarding a thing as a sign,
and hence on the assumption that it determines an interpretant,
then the minimal assumption is for it to be a symbol, which is
the generic case.

JA: The inclusion of 'icon' in your concluding remark gives me the
    feeling that you took my question as part of your dispute with
    Joe.  I did try to prevent that interpretation of my question
    by prefixing "on your interpretation of pure symbols" to the
    question.

Peirce's description of what he means by "pure symbol"
is "neither 'iconic' nor 'indicative', like the words
'and', 'or', 'of', etc.", so characterization of such
a thing is sculpted partly in relief, that is, by way
of contrast with icons and indices or any involvement
of them.  So far nobody has yet suggested that the SA
might be or involve an index, so that has not come up.

JA: Generally speaking, I think that signs are typed as they are interpreted,
    in particular, the iconic/indicial/symbolic typing of a sign is never an
    absolute or essential category but a hermeneutic, interpretive, relative
    category, dependent solely on the sort of sign relation that the sign is
    regarded as occupying.

AB: Lazy as I am, the prefixed clause at the same time has the function
    to hand over to you the job of selecting a situation in which the SA
    can be regarded in your opinion as a pure symbol.  Without insisting
    that you be specific regarding the situation itself.

I'm not sure that I get what you are saying here, but will take a guess.
The SA is a symbol in the usual situations where we're talking about it.
We have not finished our inquiry into what Peirce meant by "involve" or
its various and sundry associates, but on what seemed to be a plausible
guess that it had to do with parts of speech, or syntactic constituents --
especially likely since that is what's involved in most of the examples
that he actually gives of signs that do involve icons and indices -- it
did not seem that the SA has any syntactic parts that would make it any
kind of symbol but a pure symbol, as Peirce adumbrates the idea thereof.

AB: Now, one of two possibilities obtain, you were
    specific regarding the situation in which you
    regard the SA:

    1. as a pure symbol.

    2. as not an icon.

AB: Given my present concerns, for me, you
    were not specific regarding the choice. 

AB: For a hint at my concerns:

AB: In the Logic Notebooks peirce writes:

CSP: | I have thought of the Object of a Sign as that which determines the sign;
     | and this is well thought.  I have thought of the interpretant as that which
     | the sign determines or might determine or should determine;  but this is not
     | so well.  For my idea of determination is dyadic while the idea of the relation
     | of the interpretant to the sign is triadic.
     |
     | April 2, 1906. MS 339, 276r.

I will hazard a guess that this was an experimental assumption
that will make better sense when take in a more complete context.

AB: This is writen in the context of discussions
    on sign classifications, not in a strictly
    logical context.

AB: IN the context of his logic he writes in 1903:

CSP: | It is agreed that a certain sheet, or blackboard, shall, under the
     | name of The Sheet of Assertion, be considered as representing the
     | universe of discourse, and as asserting whatever is taken for
     | granted between the graphist and the interpreter to be true
     | of that universe.  The sheet of assertion is, therefore,
     | a graph.  CP 4.396 (1903)

This has long been my understanding.  I don't see the problem.

AB: That what is taken for granted is of habitual nature.
    In the logic the sheet and the inscribed graph meet.
    As if in the LN he is complaining of not having paid
    enough attention to the 'sheet' or 'habits taken for
    granted' or 'graphs written on' in his work on
    interpretants.

Peirce expresses pretty much the same idea time and again
beyond the context of logical graphs, for instance, in the
stuff that he often reminds us about instinctual beliefs or
unconscious assumptions.  They call these "defaults" in AI.
It may appear that he is assuming the Existential reading
in saying this, but on reflection everyone knows that what
is taken for granted is not 'ipso facto' necessarily true,
so we cannot avert a shade of the Entitative reading, too.

Jon Awbrey

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