[Inquiry] Re: Futures Of Logical Graphs -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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FOLG.  Discussion Note 41

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CH = Charles Herrman
JA = Jon Awbrey
JR = Joe Ransdell

Re: FOLG-DIS 40.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/003218.html
In: FOLG-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/thread.html#3167

Charles, Peirce List,

It will take me a while o work through your comments --
a bare beginning on that score is interspersed below.

JR: You purport to be able to work with a notion of symbolism
    which permits you to assume that symbol-based inferential
    processes are possible that do not suppose the co-operative
    function of iconically and indexically functioning elements
    in the inferential process.  I'm questioning whether or not
    that is possible for a semiotically conceived logic.

JA: I am merely assuming, along with Peirce, that there do exist symbols which
    are "neither iconic nor indicative", more specifically, that such a symbol
    does not "have an icon or an index incorporated into it", which means that
    "the active law that it is" doesn't "require its interpretation to involve
    the calling up of an image" or "require its interpretation to refer to the
    actual surrounding circumstances of the occasion of its embodiment".

CH: I wonder if we have a terminological problem here that is
    directing us to a false argument.  What if, for example,
    Peirce is taking the term "symbol" merely as a concept -—
    i.e., as a metaphysical unity that both myself and
    Whitehead would refer to as an immanent emergent.

I suspect that there are a veritable host of terminological problems here --
if saying that can avoid the hue and cry about "quibbling" and "waffling" --
but I don't think the problem lies with the ontological status of symbols.

In Peirce's usage of the words, which I take it derives from his general
understanding of Kant's, a concept is a special type of symbol, namely,
or at least roughly, a mental symbol that serves to unify the manifold
of sensuous impressions.  In other words, it is primarily a sign, and
only by our acts of reflection ever becomes an object of our thought.

Now, the confusion of concepts with their own conceptual objects
is a blurring that arises from the stance of the "conceptualist",
whom Peirce somewhere describes as being a "confused nominalist".

So I think it would be good to get clear
about this issue before trying to go on.

Jon Awbrey

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