[Inquiry] Re: Futures Of Logical Graphs -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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FOLG.  Discussion Note 36

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JA = Jon Awbrey
JR = Joe Ransdell

Re: FOLG-DIS 35.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/003209.html
In: FOLG-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/thread.html#3167

In part:

JA: The types of structure that I'm laying out now have a dual purpose.
    They show how semiotic processes of logical evaluation and proof
    can be embedded in a sign relational matrix, and they meanwhile
    provide us with a selection of simple but not entirely trivial
    examples of semiotic processes to play with.

JR responds:

JR: What I am implicitly questioning is, I suppose, the legitimacy of the
    assumption that you are dealing with semiotic processes if you are not
    assuming your formal structures to be the structures of processes of the
    sort Peirce identified as semiosis.

JR: In developing semiotic as a theoretical explication of semiosis,
    which is itself defined in terms of sign-action, Peirce may have
    been excluding the possibility that semiotic can be developed in
    the purely formal way you suppose it can.  Isn't that what is
    basically at issue in connection with the question about what
    a pure symbol is?

JR: You purport to be able to work with a notion of symbolism
    which permits you to assume that symbol-based inferential
    processes are possible that do not suppose the co-operative
    function of iconically and indexically functioning elements
    in the inferential process.  I'm questioning whether or not
    that is possible for a semiotically conceived logic.

Joe, Peirce List,

It has always been extremely difficult for me to recognize anything
I care about in your description of what you are contesting against.
There is this beef about "formalism", in the religious sense of the
suffix "-ism", and that is just not my religion.  Most of the folks
that I knew or knew about who were of that peculiar persuasion that
you constantly go on about have long passed on or long time passing
reformed their churches.  The word "formalism" itself has gone back
to meaning what it always used to mean before that transient detour
of the early 1900's when a few misguided souls made it into a dogma.

"Formal" means "concerned with form" or "having to do with form".
It doesn't mean "exclusively" or "having to do with nothing else".
Peirce, like any math-minded person, is much concerned with form.
Indeed, the most important forms of iconicity have to do with form.
"Formalism" mostly means one of two things:  (1) a particular form
of representation, a fashion of formulation, or a style or grammar;
(2) a heuristic strategy whereby one attends to the formal aspects
of things.

Like a host of misnomers that we inherited from the philosophy of that time,
the real mistake of that 1900-1930's brand of "formalism" was not even its
stress on form, but -- surprise, surprise -- its thralldom to the usually
suspect nominal thinking.  Much like the person of whom it can be said
that "all his taste is in his mouth", the nominal thinker thinks that
"all form is in syntax", that "forms are mere words", so to speak.
That is where the real error hides.

Maybe now that we've gotten that out of the way,
said Jon Hopefully, I'll be able to respond to
the points of your note in a productive way.

Probably tonight or tomorrow ...

Jon Awbrey

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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