[Inquiry] Re: Utter Indetermination -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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UI.  Discussion Note 9

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JA = Jon Awbrey
KM = Kirsti Määttänen

Kirsti, Peirce List,

Comments interspersed ...

KM: There is this argument going on between Joe and you.
    As to that, I'm a third party.  I don't share the
    standpoints of either of you.  But I do think Joe
    is right.  There is a certain slippery point you
    always take and switch the point to what you do.
    You change the question, change the issue.

JA: We're all thirds at this party ...
    but I get the vague sense you
    are calling me vague ---

KM: Well, vague was not what I had in mind concerning you.  I was being vague,
    and deliberately so.  Anyway, I get the impression you consider vagueness
    something inherently negative here, am I right?

JA: Don't tell me, tell Joe, maybe it will raise
    my status as a philosopher of the true path ...

KM: For some time I've tried to understand what the point is.
    Have not succeeded, so far.  Not as exactly as I would wish.

Okay, now that you've had a nice, er, vagation,
let us return to the more assiduous discussion,
assuming we can remember what it was all about.

Taking for granted the possibility that Peirce may have used words
like "determinate", "general", "vague", along with every other word
of the Anglish language, in more than one sense, I'll simply call to
mind the contexts where he used "general" to mean ranging in extension
and "vague" to mean ranging in comprehension (or intension), and I will
throw in the synonyms "doubt" and "uncertainty" for "indeterminacy", as
I find that these words will often serve to jog my memory about certain
indubitably significant issues.

In my own imagination, I organize these ideas about extension and intension
on what I have nicknamed the "light-cone picture" -- but it's really just the
two branches of a geometric cone, with no real connection to physics intended:

` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o.......o ` ` Properties` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\`/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` O ` ` ` ` Object` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/`\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o.......o ` ` Instances ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `

Here, the Object could be the object of a generic concept, like "human",
or it could be the object of a dynamic concept, like "system in motion".
Then the Instances are the extension of that concept through some space,
and the Properties are the comprehension of that concept, or what would
count as the intensions of the Object in question.

We can imagine the situation where we have perfect information
about an Object, knowing all its Properties and Instances, and
we can generalize this image to the sorts of situation that we
not-so-perfect human beings far more frequently find ourselves
occupying, where we have but partial information about Objects.

KM: You wrote - a considerable while ago --
    that information theory only makes
    sense in a certain context.

More likely I meant that "information" only makes sense in a certain context,
meaning that we need the setting of certain assumptions about probability
distributions and measures on probability distributions in order to say
that a given sign conveys a definite quantity of information about an
object to an interpreter.

KM: It's somewhere around the presuppositions of information theory
    where I think the slippery point is.  And binary truth-value logic.

JA: You read my mind ! -- I had already started a new file in my notes
    that embodied a title change for this thread -- it will be called:
    "Peirce's Logic Of Information" (PLOI) ...

KM: Ha! Am I a mind-reader, or what?  I'd settle with a more modest view.
    That it's only reading (some of) what you have written, and figuring
    out (some of) what has been left implicit.

KM: Anyway, I'm interested on the presuppositions and the
    limits of the proper contexts for information theory.

Okay, then, we'll keep at it.

Jon Awbrey

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