[Inquiry] Re: Futures Of Logical Graphs -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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FOLG.  Discussion Note 29

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GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: FOLG-DIS 28.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/003184.html
In: FOLG-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/thread.html#3167

Which was followed by some clarifying discussion:

JA: I do not understand your perception that
    Peirce uses "pure symbol" loosely in what
    I have labelled as Statement 1 ...
           
GR: Then we are not in disagreement, for as I've stated, I think Peirce uses the
    expression "pure symbol" loosely NOT in connection with your Statement 1, but
    elsewhere (of course I could only touch upon that territory in a brief post).
    So I don't really think we are in disagreement in that matter.

GR: In fact, I don't see much of anything to disagree with in
    your post, Jon, and that's quite gratifying, I must say.

JA: Okay, got it -- I blame the sinus headache
    that I don't have the good sense not to
    try and work in spite of -- speaking
    of involutory negations ..

GR: I know this kind of negation intimately myself --
    I hope your head is feeling better when you read this.

GR: Perhaps I should note (not quite in passing & to drum home the point as
    decisively as I can even at the risk of being repetitious) that whatever
    the pure or rich symbol may be, and even if Peirce may have confusedly
    (so, sub-optimally terminologically, in my opinion) used the expression
    "pure symbol" to refer both to (1) any symbol of reality apart from
    a given embodiment of it in an actual signification through semiosis,
    as well as, 2) those symbols which are  "neither iconic nor indicative,
    like the words and, or, of, etc." and so perhaps more properly designated
    "pure symbols", both of these kinds -- and perhaps other types and indeed
    all symbols -- require replicas to "participate"  in semiosis.

Gary, Peirce List,

In the fields that I've passed through, these sorts of issues have
outgrown their problematic childhoods a long time ago.  In AI, many
of the most basic insights of Peirce were ushered in under escort of
what its founders called the "physical symbol system hypothesis" (PSSH),
and in math these things are handled by many-layered refinement orderings
of equivalence relations and equivalence classes.  The point is that we are
always working between at least two floors, one relatively abstract or general
and one relatively concrete or special.  As for the words that so often get in
the way -- that's why we have definitions.  As long as we know what sense makes
sense in a given context we can be more tolerant toward the spells that we cast.

Jon Awbrey

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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