[Inquiry] Re: Attribute, Impute, Represent -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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AIR.  Discussion Note 30

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JA = Jon Awbrey
KM = Kirsti Määttänen

Re: AIR-DIS 29.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-May/002640.html
In: AIR-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-May/thread.html#2637

CSP: | Every word is a symbol.  Every sentence is a symbol.  Every book is a symbol.
     | Every representamen depending upon conventions is a symbol.  Just as a photograph
     | is an index having an icon incorporated into it, that is, excited in the mind by
     | its force, so a symbol may have an icon or an index incorporated into it, that
     | is, the active law that it is may require its interpretation to involve the
     | calling up of an image, or a composite photograph of many images of past
     | experiences, as ordinary common nouns and verbs do;  or it may require
     | its interpretation to refer to the actual surrounding circumstances
     | of the occasion of its embodiment, like such words as 'that', 'this',
     | 'I', 'you', 'which', 'here', 'now', 'yonder', etc.  Or it may be
     | pure symbol, neither 'iconic' nor 'indicative', like the words
     | 'and', 'or', 'of', etc.
     |
     | C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 4.447
     |
     |"Logical Tracts, No. 2" (c. 1903), in 'Collected Papers', CP 4.418-509.
     | http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/existentialgraphs4.418-529.htm

KM: Returning then to the question of
    symbols and replicas, in relation
    to the mode of being of pure symbols.

I will continue to remark that invoking the distinction between
symbols and their replicas, as an interpretation of what Peirce
is attempting to say about symbols like 'and', 'or', 'of', etc.,
is a wholly off-base reading of this passage.

KM: In CP 4.448, the following paragraph, Peirce states:
    "It is frequently desirable that a representamen should
    exercise one of those three functions [iconic, indicative,
    symbolic] to the exclusion of the other two ..."

KM: So, pure symbols consequently do exercise only the symbolic function,
    excluding the two other functions.  Of cases, where this is desirable,
    I cannot say anything.  I cannot imagine what kinds of cases they
    would be.  But, taking that Peirce's examples:

    AND OR OF 

KM: are of the nature of logical operators, I guess
    such cases must be frequent in formal logic.
    That's for you, Jon, to say.

KM: Anyway, in respect to index, Peirce takes up pure symbol
    with his analysis of the nature of the line of identity
    in existential graphs (Fig. 81) 

KM: -- is identical with -- 

KM: Peirce: "... a graph, as a symbol, is of the nature of a law, and
    is therefore general, while here there must be an identification of
    individuals.  This identification is effected not by the pure symbol,
    but by its replica, which is a thing."  (CP 4.448)

The gloss (elementary facts about sign types) is intended to
illuminate the theme (the peculiarities of (ter-)identity).
The theme is not intended to dull the shine of the gloss.
Since Peirce is not saying the same things about words
like 'and', 'or', 'of' as he says about the line of
identity, that whole line of interpretation is not
relevant to their properties, except by contrast.

KM: I wonder why Peirce does not use PURE SYMBOLIC FUNCTION,
    instead of PURE SYMBOL.  "A pure symbol" seems to
    (mis)lead into thinking in terms of replicas.

No, it need not mislead anybody who does not have
a prior theory as to what Peirce should have said.
At any rate, the contrast between the alternatives,
"a symbol may have an icon or an index incorporated
into it ... Or it may be pure symbol, neither iconic
nor indicative", together with the list of examples,
is enough to clarify both the sense of the word "pure"
and the senses of the words "iconic" and "indicative"
that Peirce is using in this passage.

KM: Anyway, these musings lead me to the conclusion that when Joe
    insisted that there is no such thing as a pure symbol, there
    indeed is not.  The reason for this being that pure symbols
    are not things.  (Although this probably was not what Joe
    had in mind.) 

KM: The basic problem, as I see it, lies in taking properly into account
    the concept of continuity.  In the introduction to the system of graphs,
    Peirce brings up the imaginary persons, the GRAPHEUS and the GRAPHIST
    (CP 4.431). The role of grapheus is to bring in continuity, while the
    graphist, working on what the (continuous) process in the mind of the
    grapheus produces, brakes the continuity into distinct steps, making
    SUCCESSIVE modifications of the entire graph. 

KM: After all, the whole point for Peirce in laying down the
    basic conventions in the system of graphs, is to "dissect
    the operations of inference into as many distinct steps as
    possible" (CP 4.424).

I'm sure that he means effective steps,
not steps that go nowhere or backward.

Jon Awbrey

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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