[Inquiry] Re: Attribute, Impute, Represent -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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AIR.  Discussion Note 29

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JA = Jon Awbrey
KM = Kirsti Määttänen

Re: AIR-DIS 28.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2005-May/002641.html
In: AIR-DIS.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-May/thread.html#2637

KM: In a similar vein that the mode of being of a symbol cannot be
    reduced to existent replicas of it, a habit cannot be reduced to
    the instances of reactions effected by e.g. replicas of a symbol.

This is a true statement.  It amounts to the objection
of a rational(ist) thinker to the imputed reductions
of a nominal(ist) thinker.  As such, it should have
been taken as well enough founded at the outset of
our discussion, and is therefore just one more of
the reasons why this whole topic of replicas was
a sheer digression.

KM: Here I get a feeling that some of listers (if reading this)
    will object, saying that the above is psychology, and Peirce
    was a proponent for unpsychological logic.  So I'll voice again
    my standpoint regarding the relation between logic and psychology
    I have reason to believe is consistent with Peirce's view.  What
    Peirce was against, was to base logic on psychology, and that is
    how I understand his critical comments.

KM: But how about psychology based on logical theory?
    In CP 4.571 Peirce, in connection with diagrammatic
    reasoning, writes:  "If logicians would only embrace
    this method, we should no longer see attempt to base
    their science on the fragile foundations of metaphysics
    or a psychology not based on logical theory ..." (CP 4.571).
    So, psychology based on logic does not seem to be something
    Peirce advices logigians, let alone semioticians, to shun.

There is some equoivocation in the term "based on".
A non-psychological view of logic is not the same
thing as anti-psychologism.  A normative science,
that proposes to have or to get knowledge about
how best to achieve certain goals, under given
conditions, can make good use of descriptive
knowledge about the landscape in which it
must say how best to achieve those goals.
Conversely, it's not possible to achieve
good descriptions without using logic.

KM: Another objection I anticipate is that what I said
    on symbols and replicas resorts to introspection,
    something Peirce has shown powerless in logic.
    And yes, I agree that strained mental inward
    staring, the method of introspection Peirce
    described as a kind of mental cramp, is of
    no avail.  But what Peirce both uses and
    recommends is mental experimentation.
    That is, methodical mental observation,
    aided by diagrams or other methods of
    making thoughts and ideas outwardly
    observable.

The question of what constitutes introspection
and what does not is not as simple as it seems,
and I will have to put it off for another time.

To be continued ...

Jon Awbrey

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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