[Inquiry] Re: Logic 101

[Jon Awbrey]

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LOG.  Note 10

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| Lowell Lecture 9 (cont.)
|
| Sensation is, as it were, the writing on the page of consciousness.
| Conception is the meaning of the sensation.  A conception, therefore,
| is not in the mind in the sense in which a sensation is;  it requires
| to be embodied in a sensation, as much as it requires to be embodied in
| matter in order to be carried out into the external world.
|
| Of the numerous conceptions of the mind, some apply only
| to certain special collections of impressions and are called
| 'particular'.  Others apply to all collections of impressions
| and are called 'universal'.  Of universal conceptions, the most
| outward, the first that is reached as truth enters the mind, is
| 'Substance' -- or the 'very thing' -- that is the conception of
| the immediately present in general.  In another point of view
| it is that which can only be subject never predicate.  The
| last conception, the most inward, which lies at the centre
| of consciousness and completes the act of understanding is
| 'being' -- or that which whatever is intelligible possesses
| in itself.
|
| Between 'substance' and 'being' we found that
| there intervene three universal conceptions: --
|
|    Reference to a Ground.
|    "         "  " Correlate.
|    "         "  " Interpretant.
|
| The manner in which we made sure that these three conceptions and these
| only intervene between the manifold of substance and the unity of being is
| sufficiently simple when you once take it in.  To avoid all confusion we began
| by distinguishing three different kinds of mental separation:  1st 'dissociation',
| 2nd 'abstraction' or 'precision', and 3rd 'discrimination'.
|
| We dissociate one object from another when we think
| of it without thinking of that other at the same time.
| We can for example dissociate a 'colour' from a 'sound';
| but we cannot dissociate space from colour.
|
| We 'prescind' one object from another,
| when we suppose it to be without that other.
| For example, we can 'prescind' space from colour
| because we can suppose a space to be uncoloured.
|
| We discriminate one thing from another when
| we can recognize that they are not the same --
| thus we can discriminate colour from space
| though we cannot prescind colour from space.
|
| The distinction seems to be sufficiently
| plain and it is perfectly indispensible.
| It is 'prescision' with which we have
| to deal in our present investigation.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 473
|
|"The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis",
| Lowell Institute Lectures (1866), pp. 357-504 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition',
|'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
| Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

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