[Inquiry] Re: Pure Symbols -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

PS.  Discussion Note 3

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

JP = Jim Piat

Re: PS-DIS 2.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/002467.html
In: PS-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-March/thread.html#2466

JP: Speaking of the purity of symbols
    Gary Richmond quotes Peirce as
    saying the following:

CSP: | Or it may be pure symbol,
     | neither iconic nor indicative,
     | like the words and, or, of, etc.

JP: Well, it does appear that I'm wrong.  Seems that in
    the Peirce quote above Peirce did have in mind the
    possibility of symbols that were neither iconic
    or indicative.

JP: But I wonder if maybe Peirce is in error in this instance.
    Could it be that words such as conjunctions and prepositions
    do have both iconic and indexical aspects?  I think Peirce got
    into a bit of trouble when he failed to recognize that qualities
    (deriving from the organization of matter in space and time) were
    as actual as mass itself.  And I think that perhaps he is here again
    failing to give due consideration to the actuality of the organizational
    component of existence.  Notice these conjunctions and prepositions do not
    simply refer to just some sort of ethereal logical syntax -- they have real
    actual referents in space and time and as relations they can be both pointed
    to as well as copied, pictured or conveyed iconicly.  The problem here, as
    I see it, is that abstract entities (such as relations in space and time)
    are sometimes taken as non-existent simply because they lack the force
    of a poke in the ribs.  But for me they are as actual as matter itself.
    Perhaps it's hard to imagine the iconic and indexical component of a
    term such as "of" or "or" because we can not sense these aspects
    of existence (or-ness, of-ness, and-ness) directly though any
    single sense.  First we must construct a notion of existence 
    (such as the one we have which is that events take place in
    a context of time and space) and then we must be able to
    discern and abstract these notions from that model.
    Existence is not a given that we sense directly.
    Existence is a creation of the mind -- part of
    a model of being through which we organized
    experience.

Jim,

You are referring to physical space-time embodiments of signs,
and we all agree that concrete tokens, qua physical existents,
have many more properties than are to be captured in one slot
of an abstract classification scheme, indeed, many properties
that are wholly impertinent to the classification of interest.
Then you refer to the reality of the abstract types, which is
precisely the point, that symbols as formal entities have the
properties that their definition binds them to, and no others.

JP: In short, I wish Peirce had not said that -- LOL.
    And I'm not sure why he did.  Can anyone shed some
    more light on why he did say that?  Short of me simply
    having to accept the fact that I'm just plain wrong about
    the purity of symbols.  I hope so -- I've got a lot riding
    on this!

Actually, there's a lot riding on the conveyance of pure symbols, too.

Jon Awbrey

Incidental Musement:

| It would be impossible to analyze representation into its inward constituent
| characters since any elements into which it might seem to be separated would
| be, themselves, representations.  Representation implies contrast;  hence it
| has an inward character only so far as that can be contrasted with something.
| Now, as all things are representations alike, they can only be contrasted in
| their relations.  Hence, the only inward character of representation is the
| relation of anything to itself, -- 'identity'.  But the different essential
| external relations of representation can be distinguished very well, because
| all things do not stand in essential relation to any one representation.
| It is true, that these relations are themselves representations and so
| involve each other.  But though they cannot be separated in the
| nature of things, they can in representation.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 324
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Logic of the Sciences", MS 113 (1865), pp. 322-336 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o