[Inquiry] Re: Manifolds Of Diverse Impressions

[Jon Awbrey]

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

MODI.  Note 3

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

| Section 1.  Impressions (concl.)
|
| No one can know what an impression is like, in itself;  for a recognized difference
| between two impressions would be a difference between them 'as compared', that is
| as mediately known, and not between them 'in themselves'.  An impression in itself
| is an uncomprehended impression, and hence, an undifferentiated sensation, like
| the feeling of our heart's motion.  Colour is sometimes given as an example of an
| impression.  It is a bad one;  because the simplest colour is almost as complicated
| as a piece of music.  Colour depends upon the 'relations' between different parts
| of the impression;  and, therefore, the differences between colours are differences
| between harmonies;  to see this difference we must have the elementary impressions
| whose relation makes the harmony.  So that colour is not an impression, but an
| inference.
| 
| Whatever part impressions play in our knowledge, they need to be reduced by
| the understanding to the unity of consistency and therefore to be combined,
| and that not by chaotic aggregation but in a determinate form.  This form
| or way of combining impressions is an element of cognition not given in
| the impressions combined, but added to them in order to reduce them to
| the requisite unity.  It is, therefore, a 'hypothetically' adjoined
| element;  for a hypothesis is something assumed in order to reduce
| an otherwise incomprehensible 'datum' to unity.  This element of
| cognition is termed 'conception'.
|
| We have, then, first an infinite manifold of points of impression upon
| the circumference of consciousness.  Second, these are embraced into
| different groups by conceptions, and these conceptions by others
| until one conception is universal and embraces all.  Third, if
| this conception has any manifoldness, it is itself subjected
| to another;  and so on until Fourthly, all are subjected to
| the unity of consistency or 'I think' which is the centre
| consciousness.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 515-516
|
|["On a Method of Searching for the Categories"], MS 133 (1866), pp. 515-528 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o