[Inquiry] Re: Grounds And Respects -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

GAR.  Discussion Note 5

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

JP = Jim Piat

Jim,

Though I wish I had, and I can remember some times in the recent past
when I thought I had, I don't think I currently have the breadth of
scope that it would take to mix the philosophical and the physical
senses of the words "form" and "matter" without making a total
mess of things, so I'll probably have to stick to the senses
that I have a sense of at the present moment.

However, by way of some free associations, here
are some semi-Peircean themes that come to mind:

"Matter is effete mind" -- that is to say,
matter is mind after the fall, mind that
has degenerated to an inertial condition.
"Mind" brings to mind 'De Anima', where
the entelechy or actuality of the mind
is sometimes identified with its form,
in essence, its living organization,
but sometimes entelechy seems to be
regarded as a tertium quid between
form and matter.  Who can say?

| Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is
| realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the
| word actuality is used in two senses, illustrated
| by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the
| exercise of it (theorein).
|
| So the soul (psyche) must be substance (ousia) in the
| sense of being the form (eidos) of a natural body (soma),
| which potentially (dynamei) has life (zoe).  And substance
| in this sense is actuality (entelecheia).
|
| Aristotle, "Peri Psyche", 2.1

The most general notion of form that I have, including but not
restricted to forms of physical matter, is summed up under the
conception of "constraint", not so much marching orders as the
condition of something "not being all it can be", well enough
expressed by saying that something is restricted to a subset
of its possible states.

For instance, a formal language exemplifies constraint,
and thus falls short of maximum entropy, because it is
limited to a subset of possible strings, L c A*, and
a sign relation exemplifies constraint in so far as
it is a subset of the relevant product of domains,
L c O x S x I.

Jon Awbrey

JP: Just composed and lost my response!  I'll try to quickly reconstruct it.
    The notion of form outlined below is what I have in mind when I refer to form
    as the organization of matter.  In effect form is the essence of an object sans
    the inertia or mass of the object.   When we imagine an object without it having
    mass it is the form of the object we have in mind.  (We can of course also imagine
    the form of mass itself  -- in terms of its consequences.)
 
JP: I have tried to argue earlier that form is as real and actual as mass
    (resistence, inertia or secondness).  Both form and secondness are
    perceived through the haptic sense  -- touch and pressure in the
    case of secondness and proprioception in the case of form.
    I have also tried to argue that other derivative examples
    of qualities or forms (such as color) depend ultimately
    on the organization of mass in space.   
 
JP: I think the reason we tend to suppose that form is less actual
    than mass is two fold.  First because the consequences of mass are
    generally more immediate that are the consequences of form.  Mass is
    apprehended in one fell swope  -- form may not even be perceived until
    some obscure consequence is encountered.  Mass can crush one directly --
    the consequences of form are more subtle.  Secondly, mass is unidimensional.
    Mass only varies by degree.  There is only one form of mass itself.  On the
    other hand forms may take many shapes.  There are three dimensions of form
    but only one dimension of mass.  I have been struggling to understand the
    concepts of both "form" and "abstract" for a long time -- years.  I think
    both have much in common and are closely tied to our notions of how matter
    is organized in space and time. The concrete we define by denoting its
    location -- but form and abstract concepts require a specification of
    an objects organization in space as well as its location.   Memory
    (perhaps the largest part of so called intelligence) clearly plays
    a far greater role in the apprehension of form and abstract notions
    than in the apprehension of so called concrete notions.  All just
    my half baked two cents.  Written to clarify my own confusion --
    not to educate others. 
 
JP: But what I'm saying above about the actuality of form is perhaps only
    a matter of semantics and a side issue at best.  The important point
    for me is that form is real and that even a symbol depends upon form.
    I might add that for me (and I think Peirce as well) a symbol also
    depends upon indexicality as well.  IOWs there are no symbols that
    do not incorporate both the notion of an icon and an index.  In a
    crude sense the iconic aspect of symbolization refers to (connotes)
    the essential (formal or potential) consequences of the object and
    the indexical aspects of the symbol referes to (denotes) the actual
    object located in space and time in which the particular essence is
    embodied.  At least that my understanding -- or misunderstanding as
    the case may be. 
 
JP: Again not to be argumentative but mostly just to follow along --
    to direct the discussion toward some of my questions without
    wanting to derail it or even unduly slow it down.  Very much
    enjoying these related threads.

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o