[Inquiry] Logic Of The Sciences

[Jon Awbrey]

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LOTS.  Note 1

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| Logic of the Sciences [MS 113, Fall-Winter 1865]
|
| 1.  Conception of Logic
|
| Against the common conception of logic, I shall urge a sweeping objection.
| Almost every definition of the science that has ever been propounded has
| made it refer exclusively to thought or cognition.  Now, if by thought is
| meant thought as it is, I object that thought is concrete and limited in
| time and otherwise, while the relations of logic have no such limitation.
| Suppose a syllogism to be written down;  then every time that it is read
| it produces conviction;  and this shows that it has a permanent convincing
| power or relevancy in itself, as much as the repeatedly observed blackness
| of the letters shows that they have a quality of blackness in themselves.
| But if by thought be meant thought in general from which eveything that
| is particular has been eliminated, I then reply that such thought cannot
| really be thought;  it is too pure and abstract;  and that consequently
| logic does not deal with psychological laws as is now commonly supposed.
| In fact, thought may be illogical;  it is only correct thought which is
| logical.  What is this correct thought?  It is thought which represents
| the intuition.  Logic therefore deals with thought only in so far as
| the latter is a representation.  And as I said every representation
| has its logical relations whether it is actually thought or not.
| So that it is more correct to say that logic is the science of
| the forms of representation than that it is the science of the
| forms of thought.
|
| It is clear, however, that not all representations
| are subjects of logic.  There are three kinds
| of representation;  which I denominate
|
|    Signification
|    Imitation
|    Verity
|
| A 'sign' is a representation which accords with its
| object without any real and essential correspondence.
|
| A 'copy' is a representation which really and in
| its self refers to its object by resembling it.
|
| A //'type'/'symbol'// is a representation whose
| correspondence with its object is of the same
| immaterial kind as a 'sign' but is founded
| nevertheless in its very nature and is
| not merely supposed and fictitious.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 322-323
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Logic of the Sciences", MS 113 (1865), pp. 322-336 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

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