[Inquiry] Re: Ground, Idea, Prescindible

[Jon Awbrey]

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GIP.  Note 7

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| Now it is to be observed that the Ground of either kind of representation is a
| common character and therefore may be prescinded.  And any common character not
| only may but does serve as the Ground of some representation.  Hence, Ground and
| Prescindible are co-extensive terms, and we may more concisely define as follows: --
|
|    Representations are either
|
|       1.  Signs;  whose prescindible is from the subject
|
|       2.  Copies;  whose prescindible is from Subject and Object
|
|       3.  Symbols;  whose prescindible is from the object.
|
| We are now ready to assign logic its definition.
| For this purpose, it must be granted that logic is
|
|    a symbol
|
|       whose essential end is
|
|          to test
|
|             ( truth,
|             <
|             ( by reasons.
|
| Now firstly since its object then is a representation which
| has a reason for its truth;  it cannot be a sign [index] for
| a sign has no ground in the object and hence is arbitrary or
| irrational.  And secondly since the object of logic has truth --
| that is determinate reference to an object and that by reason --
| it cannot be a copy [icon], for copies are true only in so far as
| they are like their objects, but nothing is totally unlike anything
| since all things are representations at least, and nothing is exactly
| like anything except that which is identical with it;  that is, itself.
| Hence copies have no determinate or exclusive reference to any objects
| but themselves.  Now the truth of a thing of itself is self-grounded
| and has no reason for reasonable truth is mediate truth.  Hence no
| copies have reasonable truth and are not objects of logic.
|
| Hence only symbols are objects of logic and as their reference
| to their object is always owing to a common character or reason
| within the objects, they all have reasonable truth and logic must
| refer to them universally.
|
| Logic tests its object.  But tests are the result of classification,
| are but the utilization of classification.  Hence logic classifies
| symbols.
|
| Now we have seen that logic comes under the genus symbol.  To define it
| we must state the difference of this genus.  But this would necessitate
| the classification of symbols which is the implication of logic.  Now a
| definition relates only to essence and does not enter into implication.
| Hence since we can go no further without entering into the implication
| of logic we must already have defined logic in saying that it is the
| symbol which classifies symbols in general in reference to the reason
| of their reference to their objects.
|          
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 328-329
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Logic of the Sciences", MS 113 (1865), pp. 322-336 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

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