[Inquiry] Re: Attribute, Impute, Represent -- Discussion
Jon Awbrey
jawbrey at att.net
Tue Mar 1 10:56:11 CST 2005
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
AIR. Discussion Note 8
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
BM = Bernard Morand
JA = Jon Awbrey
BM: Maybe the initial statement from Jon is disputable too (see further):
BM, quoting JA:
JA: For my part, I think that we have to give up on the essentialist notion
that we are classifying signs according to some essence that they possess,
and realize once and for all that the proper unit of classification is the
entire sign relation, that is, a collection of triples of the form <o, s, i>.
BM: This statement seems to be too much universal to be of use in the case at hand.
My assertion is precisely that the thesis of essentialism
is "much too universal to be of use in the case at hand".
I am not declaring for anything like "anti-essntialism",
since I suppose there very likely are such things as
essences, forms, invariants, substances, and so on.
It's just that the claim of essential rather than
accidental or relative status for an attribution,
along with any claims about wherein the essence
inheres, have to be evaluated on a case by case
basis, and the larger fraction of such claims,
throughout history, have tended to evaporate
when sufficient heat of examination has been
brought to bear on them. So I have formed
a habit of being skeptical in this regard.
BM: The problem is not the collection character of the triples but the relationships
between its members. Namely the <o, s> pair, the <s, i> pair and their mutual
relations plus the valid combinations of each of the elements in itself with
the others. In short the problem is: what kinds of forms does the form
<o, s, i> render valid? The plan of all these kinds will constitute
the classification of signs. I don't know if this one can be said
to be "essential", may be "formal" will suffice.
I'm only criticizing the claim that some absolute essence,
or some non-relative property, resides in the sign itself,
one which is sufficient to explain all the sign relations
in which that particular concrete sign might be involved.
Now it is trivially, that is, non-falsifiably possible
to devise forms of words which appear to achieve this.
I think that the 'Monadology' of Leibniz provides the
most celebrated pattern for all such performances,
at least in the West, but is it really worth the
candle in scientifically probatable terms?
I think, all in all, probably not.
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
More information about the Inquiry
mailing list