[Inquiry] Re: Ground, Idea, Prescindible

[Jon Awbrey]

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GIP.  Note 4

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I'm thinking it may be useful to subsume a couple
of previous excerpts within their larger contexts:

| The 'Summum Genus', or What is, is representation,
| then.  Now what are its proximate differences?
| To ascertain these we must first consider what
| it implies.  Certain points are implied in
| representation, because they result from
| the induction by which it was prescinded.
|
| Representation implies first an 'object' represented;
| Second a mind or rather abstracting from the personal
| element, a representation (itself or other) to which
| it addresses itself.  I call this the 'subject'.
| Third a 'Ground' or Reason which determines it
| to represent that object to that subject.
| We have nothing else implied in the
| representation as representation.
| Hence representation has three
| marks only namely --
|
|    1.  Reference to an Object
|    2.  Reference to a Ground
|    3.  Reference to a Subject.
|
| Accordingly, the differences of representation are differences of one or
| more of these marks.  As these marks are references they are determined
| first by the object of reference, 2nd by the subject of reference, and
| 3rd by the Ground of reference.  Hence, their differences (the subject
| of reference or representation being already determinate) are either
| differences of the object of reference -- i.e. Object, Ground, or
| Subject of the Representation -- or of the Ground of Reference.
| Now the ground of reference of each of these references is
| the Ground of the representation.  Hence, a difference in
| the ground of representation is the only difference which
| necessarily implies a difference in all three of the marks
| of representation.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 326-327
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Logic of the Sciences", MS 113 (1865), pp. 322-336 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

Now that one I am going to have to think about a while.

However, one of the reasons that I seized on this text
was to flag what is overall for Peirce a very atypical
use of the word "subject" in the sense of "subjective",
to single out, in effect, the interpreter or recipient
of a sign, and thus to point in the general direction
of what would otherwise be called the "interpretant".

Jon Awbrey

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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