[Inquiry] Doctrine Of Individuals -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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DOI.  Discussion Note 1

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CG = Clark Goble
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: DOI-COM 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002327.html
In: DOI-COM.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/thread.html#2327

JA: Notice that this statement, together with the maxims:

    1. "Whatever has comprehension must be general"

    2. "Whatever has extension must be composite"

    pull the rug -- and all of the elephants -- out from
    under the nominal thinker's wishful thinking to find
    ontological security in individual names, which
    nominal thinker always confuses with the names of
    individuals, to recoin a phrase.

CG: Interesting Jon.  Out of curiosity, do you think that there are some
    strong parallels between Peirce and Leibniz' monads being what one
    arrives at after an actual infinity division?  It seems that Peirce
    has something similar, only with these being ideals only that are
    never arrived at.

Gosh, I don't know.  It's been a long time since I looked into the Monadology,
and I'm not sure that I got what it was all about, but it seems like it had
something to do with rationalizing the doctrine of pre-established harmomy.
Just off the cuff, I think of Peirce's discourse-relative individuals as
having to do with the objective side of experience and Leibniz's monads
as having to do with the subjective side of experience, so maybe you
could say that there is a psycho-physical parallelism, so to speak.
On the other hand, monads seem more complex somehow than atoms.
The extensional-intensional duals that Peirce did borrow from
Leibniz are "individuals" and "simples", so maybe you could
say that monads are simples-in-themselves that reflect all
the complexity of their relationship to the other monads.
But I'm afraid that this is all just a lot of blue sky
until I can get back to the texts in question.

Have to break until later tonight ...

Jon Awbrey

CG: I ask because the doctrine of individuals you discuss and summarize well,
    seems to hinge on two interesting points.  The first is the impossibility
    of an infinite process thus making the logical atom unable to be realized
    in thought or sense.  Yet, as Peirce's discussion of how mind can affect
    matter and vice versa, Peirce seems to suggest that there are real infinite
    processes in our everyday phenomena.  Now presumably he would recognize
    a difference between an infinity of logical steps conducted they way we
    normally conduct logic, but recognize that there are many other infinite
    processes.

CG: The reason I ask, is because one of Leibniz' more provocative doctrines 
    was that of actual infinities - something that he was often criticized 
    for by later philosophers and that few today take seriously.  Indeed 
    Peirce's notion of continuity which seems to entail actual infinities 
    is, in my opinion, fairly unique and intriguingly Leibnizean.  Would 
    you agree?  And if so, what would you say that main differences are.  
    (In the consideration of infinities and not comparing Peirce's
    logical atoms with Leibniz' monads)

CG: The other intriguing question is whether Peirce's notion of
    "in the long run" which is the ideal end of inquiry, could be
    considered in all this.  If Truth is this ideal end, and perhaps
    also "substance" if we adopt his earliest writings, then his notion
    of determining logical atoms may also apply.

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