[Inquiry] Re: Doctrine of Individuals

[Jon Awbrey]

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DOI.  Note 3

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| Individual
|
| (As a technical term of logic, 'individuum' first appears
| in Boethius, in a translation from Victorinus, no doubt
| of 'atomon', a word used by Plato ('Sophistes', 229 D)
| for an indivisible species, and by Aristotle, often in
| the same sense, but occasionally for an individual.
| Of course the physical and mathematical senses of
| the word were earlier.  Aristotle's usual term for
| individuals is 'ta kath ekasta', Latin 'singularia',
| English 'singulars'.)
|
| Used in logic in two closely connected senses.
|
| (1) According to the more formal of these an individual is an object (or term)
| not only actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general
| character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated by
| its mode of being to be so determinate.  See Particular (in logic).
|
| This definition does not prevent two distinct individuals from being
| precisely similar, since they may be distinguished by their hecceities
| (or determinations not of a generalizable nature);  so that Leibniz's
| principle of indiscernibles is not involved in this definition.
|
| Although the principles of contradiction and excluded middle may be regarded
| as together constituting the definition of the relation expressed by "not",
| yet they also imply that whatever exists consists of individuals.  This,
| however, does not seem to be an identical proposition or necessity of
| thought;  for Kant's Law of Specification ('Krit. d. reinen Vernunft',
| 1st ed., 656, 2nd ed., 684;  but it is requisite to read the whole
| section to understand his meaning), which has been widely accepted,
| treats logical quantity as a continuum in Kant's sense, i.e., that
| every part of which is composed of parts.  Though this law is only
| regulative, it is supposed to be demanded by reason, and its wide
| acceptance as so demanded is a strong argument in favour of the
| conceivability of a world without individuals in the sense of
| the definition now considered.
|
| Besides, since it is not in the nature of concepts adequately
| to define individuals, it would seem that a world from which
| they were eliminated would only be the more intelligible.
|
| A new discussion of the matter, on a level with
| modern mathematical thought and with exact logic,
| is a desideratum.  A highly important contribution
| is contained in Schroeder's 'Logik', iii, Vorles. 10.
| What Scotus says ('Quaest. in Met.', VII 9, xiii & xv)
| is worth consideration.
| 
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.611-612
|
|'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology',
| J.M. Baldwin (ed.), Macmillan, New York, NY,
| Volume 1, pp. 537-538, 2nd edition 1911.

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