[Inquiry] Re: Doctrine Of Individuals -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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DOI.  Discussion Note 8

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BB = Bill Bailey

Re: DOI-DIS 7.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-February/002346.html
In: DOI-DIS.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-February/thread.html#2343

BB: If "an unlimited amount of information" means the same as "infinite information",
    it's an oxymoron, which is how I first read the post, and, I took it, your
    wry-sounding reply that we don't know.  An infinity of information requires
    an infinite channel, which are equally oxymoronic as any particular event
    in an infinite channel would be equally likely with any other event --
    i.e.,  it would lack the necessary systemic (stochastic) constraints
    (or systematic covariance with an external system) to be a channel.
    If "unlimited amount of information" means "an unspecifiable amount"
    of "it's green", "solid", "round", etc., but an amount we'll recognize
    when it is sufficient, your reply is still correct, but with less
    wryness.  If it means an infinite amount of "it's green", solid",
    "round", etc., then we are back to an oxymoron again because the
    infinity would surely encompass "not-green", "not-solid", etc.,
    and your reply is back to sounding wry again.

Bill,

There are many interesting side-tracks here, but before
we get too far down the scenic railroad on some of them,
let's recall that this whole question initially rose in
connection with Peirce's definition of a "logical atom"
as a "term not capable of logical division", in essence,
"one of which every predicate may be universally affirmed
or denied".  The real problem here is with the invocation
of "every predicate", all of which possible predicates we
never really invoke in a well-bounded frame of reference,
but more sensibly limit ourselves to some well-defined
channel, code set, discursive universe, formal language,
family of natural kinds, or whatever you want to call it.

In Peirce's original context, it is reasonable to imagine that we can always
think of one more predicate to divide whatever term we are given, since there
is no talk yet of realistic practical constraints on our imagination.  In that
frame of mind, what Peirce says about logical atoms, that they "can be realized
neither in thought nor in sense", seems true enough.

By way of a slippery slope that I'm still trying to plot the grade of,
we graduated from this talk of unrealizable logical atoms to talking
of whole systems, some very different from atoms in their imagery,
that take overwhelmingly lots and lots of information to specify.
The question there becomes, not whether we can imagine new ways
to split the evolutionary heirs of the system, but whether we
really need to in order to tie the system down sufficiently
securely.  Whatever the situation with abstract, extreme,
ideal cases, it seems clear enough that we commonly find
ourselves pressed in our concrete, middling, practical
situations to invoke as yet unconsidered distinctions
in order to describe the situation adequately.  And
since the use of abstract extreme ideals is mainly
to illuminate concrete middling practice, we are
brought to this pass in any case.

One of the interesting issues that arises here is the issue of abduction.
The problem of abductive inference is the problem of "changing channels",
that is, a study of the forces that lead us to add a new concept, all the
better to unify the manifold of sensuous impressions, and the reasons why
it might be impossible to unify sense in a reasonable fashion without it.

Jon Awbrey

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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