[Inquiry] Re: Doctrine Of Individuals -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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DOI.  Discussion Note 6

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JA = Jon Awbrey
KT = Konrad Talmont-Kaminski

Re: DOI-COM 3.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002329.html
In: DOI-COM.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/thread.html#2327

Konrad,

I am still ruminating, not too successfully, on the Russell comparison,
but perhaps this will serve to jog my memory of where we last left off.

KT: Although I have been lurking about for a while, this is my first post to
    this list.  Please forgive (but point out) any failures in netiquette.

JA: Two of the immediate consequences of this observation are these:

    1.  There are no such things as absolutely individual terms, properly speaking.
        If you have things that you find it convenient to call "individual terms"
        in a particular discussion, then one thing that they do not do is denote
        or determine absolute indivisibles.  This is the reason that Peirce,
        when he is being precise, will speak of "particulars" instead.

    2.  If you seek the "difference that makes a difference" among individual terms,
        particular terms, and general terms, it will not be an absolute or essential
        difference, but rather an interpretive or discourse-relative difference.

KT: As has already been pointed out in a different discussion, Peirce is dealing
    here with some of the same issues that Russell deals with in 'Logical Atomism'
    and 'Lectures on Logical Atomism'.  What is interesting, I think, is that, even
    though Russell's stance is generally anti-pragmatist, on this particular issue
    he takes up a position which is very similar to Peirce's.

KT: In his introduction to 'Logical Atomism' David Pears sees Russell as
    either having an Empiricist or a Rationalist view regarding what Russell
    calls 'simples'.  The Empiricist view would be that we have shown them to
    be indivisible by some empirical means while the Rationalist view would
    be that they have been shown to be indivisible on some a priori grounds.
    Not surprisingly, Pears is able to show both these views to be highly
    problematic.  What he does not take into consideration and what appears
    to be best defended by the text, including Russell's actual responses
    to questions, is that Russell had what might be called a Pragmatist
    view, i.e. this is as far as our analysis has gone and for the
    needs at hand it does not have to go any further.

JA: Welcome to the forum.  For the sake of possible later discussion,
    here are some excerpts from Russell that I collected a couple of
    years back:

    POLA.  Philosophy Of Logical Atomism
           http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/thread.html#674

    RTOK.  Russell's Theory Of Knowledge
           http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/thread.html#758

    RTOP.  Russell's Treatise On Propositions
           http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/thread.html#761

JA: I have to say I'm skeptical of any postive comparisons between Russell and Peirce,
    in part because Russell tends to make up his own definitions for the techinal terms
    of his predecessors, whether from lack of acquaintance or presumption of superiority
    it's always hard to tell.  For instance, "individual" and "simple" are contrasting
    terms in Leibniz and in Peirce -- what we'd call "lattice duals" today -- so it
    may not be possible to arrange a meeting of the minds on this particular score.

Jon Awbrey

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