[Inquiry] Re: Sign Relations -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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SR.  Discussion Note 27

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JA = Jon Awbrey
JP = Jim Piat

Re: SR-COM 31.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-December/003332.html
In: SR-COM.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-December/thread.html#3325

Jim, Peirce List,

There's a bit more to say on this point:

JP: My sense is that the syntax embedded in natural languages conforms
    (at a deep level) very closely to the grammar of the real world --
    but I'm not quite sure if this is the issue you are contesting
    or just what you mean by the "confounding the forms of objects
    with the forms of syntax".  Please tell me more, I'm interested.

Some of the most difficult advances in logic, math, and even the special
sciences have had to overcome the obstacles that are thrown in our way,
projected onto the scene by the by apparent transparency of language,
as it were.  A big part of overcoming the particle versus wave split
in physics was due to the iron grip that the subject-predicate or
noun-verb pattern of familiar languages had on our imaginations.
Peirce, along with other formal reasoners in the 19th Century,
struggled mightily with this lack of complementarity in the
infrastructure of Indo-European syntax, as it interferes
with the ability to treat k-adic relations in anything
but reductionary terms.  And that revolution has yet
to work its way through, even among many readers of
Peirce, as many of our misundertandings here show,
in particular, the one about icons being involved
in every symbol, not just complex propositions,
which is the implicit subject in every context
where Peirce speaks of symbols involving icons.

JA: As we have discussed on many occasions, determination is not a property
    of single cases, single pairs of elements, or single tuples in relation.
    It is a concept that only makes sense with regard to whole systems that
    are affected by or participate in systematic relations of the type that
    we call determinate.

JA: Determination is not just a property of 2-adic relations, as "x determines y",
    but is a concept that can be applied to arbitrary relations, even those which
    do not have a definable arity or adicity.  Without going to those extremes of
    generality just yet, however, we can say for the present that it also applies
    to k-adic relations, as "x_1 determines x_2, ..., x_k".  We're naturally very
    focused on the present application to sign relations, in the case where k = 3.

JP: OK, fine, determination in all cases (dyadic and triadic) but would it not be
    helpful (given the importance attached to the distinction between the two) to
    have a separate term for the sort of determination (or dare I say cause) that
    occurs in each case.

I think it's helpful to use a generic word for a generic idea,
and to use differential adjectives to distinguish the species.
We have to say what dimensions of relations we are discussing,
anyway, so there's no reason for confusion if we just do that.

JP: And on a related note -- I'm often confused as to when Peirce is using
    sign to refer to an index and when he is using sign as the generic term
    for iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs.  I think he may have switched
    his usage at some point to avoid confusion but left me confused.  Do you
    or others know if I am correct about this or just confused.  I think this
    "double" usage may account for some of the differing opinions as to whether
    or not Peirce fundamentally changed his view of signs over the course of his
    work.  Joe I'd be especially interested in your comments regarding this if you
    are reading this and have the time/interest.

My impression is that he made this switch very early on,
so we only have to look harder for contextual clues as
to what he's talking about in the earliest writings.

Jon Awbrey

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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