[Inquiry] Re: Logic 101

[Jon Awbrey]

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

LOG.  Note 7

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

| Logic Chapter 1 (concl.)
|
| As relations separate into two kinds on account of the
| double reference they contain, so representations from
| containing a triple reference separate into three kinds.
|
| For the relation of a repraesentamen to its object (correlate) may
| be a real relation and, then, either an agreement or a difference,
| or it may be an ideal relation or one from which the reference to
| a correspondent (subject of representation) cannot be prescinded
| by position.
|
| In the first case, that is where the repraesentamen has a real agreement
| with its object, the representation consists in the 'likeness';  a simple
| quality of the object is shown but the object itself is not said to exist.
|
| In the second case, there is a real difference of the repraesentamen from its
| object, that is to say not a mere difference in quality but also a bringing
| of them together in nature;  in this case the representative character of
| the one will consist in constant accompaniment by the other, so that it
| 'indicates' the existence of the latter without noting any characters
| of it.  Such a representation may be termed an 'index'.
|
| In the third case, where the relation of the repraesentamen to
| its object is ideal, the ground of this relation is an attribute
| of the correlate 'attributed' to the relate, and then the relate
| or repraesentamen represents the object or correlate on account
| of the quality attributed to it.  This gives a 'general sign',
| a word or conception, for the repraesentamen will necessarily
| apply to everything which contains its attributed quality.
|
| In order to find a fit term for this kind of representation
| we shall do well to recall the following celebrated passage
| of Leibniz.  "For the most part", says he, "especially in
| //longer/more remote// analysis, we do not intuite at once
| the whole nature of the thing, but in place of the things
| use signs, whose explication in any present cognition we
| are accustomed to pretermit, knowing or believing that
| we have it in our power;  so when I think a chiliogon
| or polygon of a thousand equal sides, I do not always
| consider [...]"
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 355-356
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Logic Chapter 1", MS 115 (1866), pp. 351-356 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition',
|'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
| Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o