[Inquiry] Re: Logic 101

[Jon Awbrey]

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LOG.  Note 5

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| Logic Chapter 1 (cont.)
|
| We have, then, a uniform chain of conceptions stretching from pure being
| to the intuition in general.  Now the three links composing this chain,
| namely, reference to a ground, to a correlate, and to a correspondent
| afford the elements for a complete system of logic.
|
| Abstraction or precision is of two kinds;  by obscuration and by position.
| Thus, 'two' may be prescinded from 'units' by neglecting to make distinct
| the fact that it is always[,] even in conception[,] composed of units.
| On the other hand an elastic incompressible medium may be considered
| abstractedly of any phenomena of light or heat, by neglecting to
| take account of the circumstances which alone could give rise
| to such a conception.*
|
| Now, it is clear from what has been said, that the reference to a ground may
| be prescinded by position from the reference to a correlate, and the latter
| in the same way from reference to a correspondent.  Whereas, the reference
| to a correspondent cannot be prescinded by position from reference to
| a correlate, nor this from reference to a ground.  This fact affords
| the basis for a division of 'attributes' into three kinds.  First,
| such as contain only reference to a ground;  or simple 'Qualities'.
| Second, such as contain references to a ground and a correlate
| necessarily connected together;  or real 'Relations'.  Third,
| such as involve references to a ground, a correlate, and
| a correspondent necessarily connected together;
| or 'Representations'.
|
|* Neither kind of precision is at all the same as 'partition' or separation by
|  the imagination.  The distinction between imagining and conceiving is a part
|  of the very alphabet of philosophy.  To imagine is to reproduce in the mind
|  elementary sensible intuitions and to take them up in some order so as to
|  make an image.  To conceive is to collect under a supposition, to make
|  a hypothesis, and therefore cannot dispense with the use of words.
|  Thus, we comprehend the phenomena of polarization by the conception
|  of a perfectly elastic incompressible solid.  No one can imagine
|  such a solid, because nothing like it is met with in experience
|  except surfaces.  But we can conceive it very well inasmuch as
|  we can consistently state its deduced properties.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 353-354
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Logic Chapter 1", MS 115 (1866), pp. 351-356 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition',
|'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
| Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

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