[Inquiry] Re: Attribute, Impute, Represent -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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AIR.  Discussion Note 15

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JA = Jon Awbrey
JP = Jim Piat

Re: AIR-COM 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002565.html
In: AIR-COM.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/thread.html#2565

Jim,

I continue from where I left off ...

JP: In my view the critical point (as pertains to the discussion
    of whether symbols are necessarily iconic in their function) is
    that according to the above account the ground of the relationship
    between the object and the representamen in the case of both icons
    and 'general signs' is an agreement in quality.  In the case of icons
    this agreement is real but in the case of general signs this agreement
    is attributed.  I agree with all Jon says below except in paragraph
    four (4) I would not have equated 'applies' with 'denotes'.

It appears that we need to split another hank of hairs at this
point in time, since we 'apparently' need a couple of new terms:
(1) for a symbol that does not of necessity involve an icon in any
way, shape, or fashion as an adjunct to performing as a symbol, and
(2) for a symbol that does not of necessity involve an index in any
way, shape, or fashion, as an adjunct to performing as a symbol.
I would say that the word "symbol" suffices for both of these,
but we 'apparently' need a name for the classes as conceived,
however empty these classes may be in actual point of fact.
I don't have any alternative names in mind in present but
will sleep on it.

JP: Also I have a further comment regarding Jon's remarks about the
    distinction between an attribute and an attributed attribute.

I don't get the sense that Peirce is deliberately punning here,
at least not in any sort of malicious way, but I do from time
to time get the suspicion that our evoluted natural languages
have a distinctive malice aforethought weft into their warps.
I think it can all be sorted out, howeaver, if not always
by trying to fight words with words.  For the time being,
it helps to realize that phrases like "imputed quality"
are really circumlocutions for 3-adic relative terms
like "quality imputed to __ by __", and thus that it
is a category error, in several senses of the word
"category" to put imputed qualities on a par with
absolute qualities, acquired natures, and so on.

JP: I would suppose that what Jon has is mind is the distinction
    between a 'real' attribute and one which is ideal or depends
    upon what someone thinks is an attribute.  If a representamen
    and its object have a real quality in common the representamen
    is a real icon.

Of course you know this, but only if the common quality,
of which there might indeed be innumerable possibilities,
is the particular common quality in virtue of which the
sign is interpreted to be a sign of that object.

JP: If a representamen and its object have an attributed
    quality in common (ie a real qualtity of the icon which
    is only attributed to the representamen) the representamen
    is a general sign or symbol.  So the ground on which both
    icons and symbols relate to their objects is the same --
    namely a commonality of quality.

Not quite.  There can be no commonality between the quality
and the attributed quality, or at best, nothing more than a
"partially nominal commonality", a commonality in name only,
and indeed, in only parts of their names.

JP: In the case of icons this common quality is real.  In the case of
    symbols this common quality is a real enough quality of the object
    but is only attributed to the representamen.  Attribution is triadic
    and depends upon an attributant or interpretant.  Mere correspondence
    in fact is dyadic.   So, in conclusion, are icons and symbols the same?
    No.  Are icons and symbols similar in that both depend upon correspondence
    of quality between the object and the representamen?  Yes.  Can a symbolic
    representamen also contain traces of an iconic representamen?  Yes.  Can
    there be a symbolic representamen that contains no trace of an iconic
    representamen?  Yes.  Is such a symbol a pure symbol?  I suppose one
    could say yes and no depending upon what one meant by 'pure symbol'.

This seems like a plausible enough reading up to this point,
but I still have my worries about a couple of details that
only further reading and thinking may help to unravel.

JP: But can there be a symbol (however pure) that is not grounded
    (like an icon) on similarity (real or attributed) between
    the symbolic representamen and the object?  No.

Here I have graver doubts.  It still seems to me, on the
strength of other definitions of the sign relation, that
a sign can bear information about an object without the
involvement of adjunctive icons or indices of any sort.

Jon Awbrey

JP: Anyway that's my latest attempt at understanding of both sides of
    this discussion. For me understanding of both sides necessarily
    implies reconciliation.  Even in diametric opposition their is
    reconciliation if the relationship between both sides is
    understood.  For me a contradiction is merely a dyadic
    view of a triadic relationship.  There is always room
    for agreement if the intepretive frame is expanded.
    And until this frame is expanded to the point of
    agreement there is something about one or both 
    sides of the argument that one or both sides
    do not understand about the other.  That's my
    contribution to world peace --- piss off and
    insult both sides.  Just kidding of course.

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inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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