[Inquiry] Re: Attribute, Impute, Represent -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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AIR.  Discussion Note 14

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JA = Jon Awbrey
JP = Jim Piat

Re: AIR-COM 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002565.html
In: AIR-COM.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/thread.html#2565

JP: Jon, I've borrowed your fine post to provide some
    alternative intepretations of my own.  I'm not sure
    I disagree with anything you've said, but perhaps in
    emphasizing different aspects of Peirce's comments I
    have reached a slightly different conclusion than you.
    Perhaps differing more in emphasis than substance.
    But maybe not.  I'll leave that to your keen eye.

JA: Joe Ransdell includes this citation in his
    web page entitled "Symbols Involve Icons".

    | W 1,355   MS 115 Logic Chapter 1, Winter-Spring 1866
    |
    | In the third case [that of the symbol], where the relation of the
    | repraesentamen to its object is ideal, the ground of this relation
    | is an attribute of the correlate attributed to the relate, and then
    | the relate or repraesentamen represents the object or correlate on
    | account of the quality attributed to it.  This gives a general sign,
    | a word or conception, for the repraesentamen will necessarily apply
    | to everything which contains its attributed quality.
    |
    | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/quotes/iconrole.htm

JA: So let as look at this excerpt in a larger context.
    Peirce's text is quoted with left marginal bars.
    My own comments are interspersed unindented.

CSP: | As relations separate into two kinds on account of the
     | double reference they contain, so representations from
     | containing a triple reference separate into three kinds.

JP: Above Peirce is telling us that he is about to discuss the three (3)
    kinds of relations that can be found in triadic representations.

CSP: | For the relation of a repraesentamen to its object (correlate) may
     | be a real relation and, then, either an agreement or a difference,

JP: Above Peirce introduces the first two types of relations
    both of which he calls real (ie not dependent upon what you
    or I or anyone else thinks about them or imputes to them).
    A relation based upon based on either real agreement (as
    is an icon with its object) or a difference (as is an
    index with its object).

CSP: | or it may be an ideal relation or one from which the reference to
     | a correspondent (subject of representation) cannot be prescinded
     | by position.

JP: Above Peirce introduces the third type of relation which he calls ideal.

Okay so far, but here I sense the need to go back and
pick up some prior passages on the different types of
abstractions, dissociations, and prescissions that
Peirce is using here, and also to comment on what
appears to be a certain inconsistency in the way
that he speaks of what is prescinded from what.
Whether this is principled, simply careless,
or nothing but my lack of understanding is
something that I cannot tell at present.

CSP: | In the first case, that is where the repraesentamen has a real
     | agreement with its object, the representation consists in the
     | 'likeness';  a simple quality of the object is shown but the
     | object itself is not said to exist.

JP: Above Peirce is elaborating on the nature of an icon.  He notes
    that there is real agreement or likeness between the representamen
    and its object but that displaying the likeness of an object does not
    by itself state that the object exists.  (I can show you a picture of
    a horse but that horse may be long dead and glue).

Indeed, one of the videos that I like best tells
a likely tale about an eminently likable unicorn
who most likely never existed at all, that is to
say, not this side of our human imaginations.

CSP: | In the second case, there is a real difference of the repraesentamen 
     | from its object, that is to say not a mere difference in quality

JP: Above Peirce is talking about indexes.
    A indexical representamen differs from
    it's object in quality and hence is not
    an icon.

At any rate, whether it shares a quality with its object or not,
it does not, as an index, denote its object by virtue of that.

CSP: | but also a bringing of them together in nature;
     | in this case the representative character of the
     | one will consist in constant accompaniment by the
     | other, so that it 'indicates' the existence of the
     | latter without noting any characters of it.  Such a
     | representation may be termed an 'index'.

Please note the use of the term "representative character" of a sign.
It tells us that not all characters of a sign are absolute qualities.

JP: Above Peirce notes that the defining character of an
    indexical representamen is that the representamen is
    correlated in time/space with its object but alas
    the indexical representamen (unlike an icon) does
    not indicate any of the qualities of its object.

Roughly okay, but spacetime is a actually very complex construct,
much more complex than the basic sorts of information-theoretic
relationships that are the foundation of semiotics and logic.
Indeed, one can say that the construct of spacetime depends
in large measure on the prior establishemnt of informative,
logical, mathematical, and semiotic structures.

JP: So far above Peirce has introduced the icon which presents something
    of the quality but not existance (in space/time) of an object, and
    the index which announces the existence or presence of its object
    in space/time but indicates nothing of the quality of its object.
    (One might wonder what a combination of the two might yield.)

Many such complexi are possible -- sorry, I can't off hand remember
the declension of "complexus" -- but none of them will yield a symbol,
whose being is prime.

CSP: | In the third case, where the relation of the repraesentamen to
     | its object is ideal, the ground of this relation is an attribute
     | of the correlate 'attributed' to the relate, and then the relate
     | or repraesentamen represents the object or correlate on account
     | of the quality attributed to it.  This gives a 'general sign',
     | a word or conception, for the repraesentamen will necessarily
     | apply to everything which contains its attributed quality.

JP: Above Peirce introduces the third type of relation a representatmen
    might have with its object.  He call this third type ideal because
    unlike the first two above (which were real) this type of relation
    depends upon what you or I or somebody thinks about it or attributes
    to it.  He elaborates that the ground or basis of this relationship
    is that an (real) attribute (quality) of the object (correlate) is
    attributed (ideally) to the representamen.  He calls this third
    type a 'general sign'.

There is a certain amount of wiggle room in this description
as to what is being attributed to what, indeed, as to what
order and remove of attribution is involved with each of
the elements involved.  Again, I see the need to read
some prior passages on how Peirce uses his complex
notions of attribution in this time period.

Have to break for lunch ...

Jon Awbrey

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