[Inquiry] Re: Examples Of Inquiry -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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EOI.  Discussion Note 22

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JA = Jon Awbrey
TG = Tom Gollier

Re: EOI 14.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001908.html
In: EOI.     http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1704

Tom,

I continue from where I left off ...

TG: Unfortunately, I think making rain the object
    in the one diagram and switching the the case
    and result/fact in the other has precisely
    the same effect.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean here.

TG: The elements and inferences are being illustrated by a the [?] diagram
    that resembles faces in the clouds.  The mediating aspect of any sign
    is lost with rain on the one side as object and rain (as thought) on
    the other side as interpretant;  while reversing the case and result
    renders the deductive inference (from antecedent to consequent) into
    an invalid one from consequent to antecedent.

TG: Meanwhile, you seem to insist that "deduction" be sacredly
    apodictic, and I guess, not applicable at all until we have
    retired to the diagram itself, divorced from any kind of
    experiential relevance.

TG: But, all this also explains why I've never been too good at
    the scholarly pursuit of philosophy.  If you disagree with
    the basic presuppositions, how can you keep on trying to
    follow all the reasoning that can continues to be piled
    on top of them.  Philosophers should stick to short,
    article- or even email-length, writings.

I guess I don't understand what you want here.
The phenomena of rain and walking and surprise
and thinking and choosing a course of action are
the primary appearances of reality, and it's up to
us to describe them how we may, in ways that explain
what we think needs explaining.  All these theories of
weather or signs or inquiry and all these terms of art
are only meant for that.  Peirce's mansion has rooms
for all the things that we seem to want, only there
are plaques on the doors, not on our teeth, that
have funny names peculiar to his line of thought
and the tradition of thinking that he carries
not caries forward.

The name "deduction" is pinned on an ideal limiting form
of exact explicative inference that would be what it is
under any name.  There are even forms of approximate,
modal, and probable explicative inference where
you can have less than 100% certainy weighing
on the various premisses.  If you seek forms
of reasoning to account for the sorts of
approximate amplicative suggestions
that we use everyday, then you
find them described under the
headings of "abductive" and
"inductive" reasoning.
It's all there.

Jon Awbrey

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