[Inquiry] Re: Examples Of Inquiry -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

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EOI.  Discussion Note 3

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JA = Jon Awbrey
TG = Tom Gollier

TG: I'm looking at the sign and interpretant as "diagrams"
    such as are described at CP 2.227-8.

| 227. 
 The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which
| ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories of 
| philosophers     sometimes hardly leave room. It is a familiar experience to 
| every human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means, and 
| to follow that wish by the question, 'Should I wish for that thing just the 
| same, if I had ample means to gratify it?' To answer that question, he searches 
| his heart, and in doing so makes what I term an abstractive observation. He 
| makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of 
| himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state of things would 
| require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, *observes* 
| what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be 
| discerned. 


| 228.  A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
| something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates 
| in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. 
| That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The 
| sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all 
| respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the 
| *ground* of the representamen. 
"

Tom,

You adduce a couple of very important passages, to which we two
and others have returned many times.  For future reference, let
me just connect to another context where they came up, and which
formed a critical turning point in my own understanding of them,
as I think that this whole question may rate another visitation:

Inquiry Into Inquiry:
III.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03077.html

Logic As Semiotic:
LAS.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/thread.html#844

TG: Thus, in the diagram:

o------------------------------------------------------------------------o 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `o Sign (Sensory Cool Air, Dark Cloud)` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
| ` Object o-----<| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `o Interpretant (Mental Cool Air, Dark Cloud = rain) | 
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `| 
o------------------------------------------------------------------------o 
Figure 1*. Sign Relation in Dewey's "Rainy Day Inquiry" 

TG: both sign and interpretant are taken as diagrams with certain elements
    and relations between them based on the "ground" of, say, rain or the
    possibility of rain as the basis for abstractively observing the sign
    or imagining the interpretant.  If we ask, abstracted from what, or
    what is the object, that can only be the context or situation.
    If we try to specify the object in any more detail or exactness,
    we don't have an object at all but rather another sign. 

I detect a certain ambiguity in your use of the word "diagram" here.
Figures 1 and 1* are diagrammatic representations of sign relational
triples.  I would call them higher order signs of a particular type,
and have classified these sorts of HO signs elsewhere on the web.

Let me pause here, and see if we have an understanding on that point.

Jon

TG: Of course, this is where I always get hit with that
    "sign, sign, everything's a sign" refrain, and it's
    true the object can be represented by a sign.  That's
    what we're doing here.  If we represent it with another
    sign, it's own sign apart from the sign and interpretant
    of this diagram, then we just play the same game we're
    playing now with a different sign and its interpretant
    and its object. That's not what seems to be going on
    with the "ordinary" guy in Dewey's example.  With him
    there's just the abstractive observation (sign) resulting
    in an imagined diagram (interpretant) from which he infers
    "rain". The object, the context or situation, is indeed the
    third element, the one we are in fact making explicit only
    in this one respect with this sign and this interpretant.

TG: In short, I've always felt it's a cheap trick to pretend to solve
    the problems posed by the Kantian thing-in-itself by the citing the
    fact we do invent signs to represent it. Geez, no problem there.  And,
    I think when Peirce said objects are signs he had in mind more the way
    a diagram, such as our modern scientific view of the solar system, can
    come to take the place of the object itself. If the guy in the example 
    were abstracting the elements and relationships of this sign and
    interpretant from a fully developed scientific conception of weather,
    it elements and interactions, that had stood the inductive tests of
    time such that he would take that diagram for the object itself, then
    we might say that is the sign-object in the above diagram.  But that
    would be a different, more sophisticated example; one that Peirce got
    to in the omitted part of 2.227, but one I don't think we should jump
    to too quickly.

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