[Inquiry] Re: Extension x Comprehension = Information

[Jon Awbrey]

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Note 3

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| For this purpose, I must call your attention to
| the differences there are in the manner in which
| different representations stand for their objects.
|
| In the first place there are likenesses or copies -- such as
| 'statues', 'pictures', 'emblems', 'hieroglyphics', and the like.
| Such representations stand for their objects only so far as they
| have an actual resemblance to them -- that is agree with them in
| some characters.  The peculiarity of such representations is that
| they do not determine their objects -- they stand for anything
| more or less;  for they stand for whatever they resemble and
| they resemble everything more or less.
|
| The second kind of representations are such as are set up
| by a convention of men or a decree of God.  Such are 'tallies',
| 'proper names', &c.  The peculiarity of these 'conventional signs'
| is that they represent no character of their objects.  Likenesses
| denote nothing in particular;  'conventional signs' connote nothing
| in particular.
|
| The third and last kind of representations are 'symbols' or general
| representations.  They connote attributes and so connote them as to
| determine what they denote.  To this class belong all 'words' and
| all 'conceptions'.  Most combinations of words are also symbols.
| A proposition, an argument, even a whole book may be, and
| should be, a single symbol.
|
| CSP, CE 1, pages 467-468.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|"The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis",
| Lowell Institute Lectures of 1866, pages 357-504 in:
|
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition',
|'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
| Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

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