[Arisbe] Re: Determination

[Jon Awbrey]

¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤

| But not to follow this subject too far, we have
| now established three species of representations:
| 'copies', 'signs', and 'symbols';  of the last of
| which only logic treats.  A second approximation to
| a definition of it then will be, the science of symbols
| in general and as such.  But this definition is still
| too broad;  this might, indeed, form the definition of
| a certain science which would be a branch of Semiotic
| or the general science of representations which might
| be called Symbolistic, and of this logic would be
| a species.  But logic only considers symbols
| from a particular point of view.
|
| A symbol in general and as such has three relations.
| The first is its relation to the pure Idea or Logos
| and this (from the analogy of the grammatical terms
| for the pronouns I, It, Thou) I call its relation
| of the first person, since it is its relation to
| its own essence.  The second is its relation to
| the Consciousness as being thinkable, or to any
| language as being translatable, which I call its
| relation to the second person, since it refers to
| its power of appealing to a mind.  The third is its
| relation to its object, which I call its relation to
| the third person or It.  Every symbol is subject to
| three distinct systems of formal law as conditions
| of its taking up these three relations.  If it
| violates either one of these three codes, the
| condition of its having either of the three
| relations, it ceases to be a symbol and makes
| 'nonsense'.  Nonsense is that which has a certain
| resemblance to a symbol without being a symbol.  But
| since it simulates the symbolic character it is usually
| only one of the three codes which it violates;  at any rate,
| flagrantly.  Hence there should be at least three different kinds
| of nonsense.  And accordingly we remark that that we call nonsense
| meaningless, absurd, or quibbling, in different cases.  If a symbol
| violates the conditions of its being a determination of the pure
| Idea or logos, it may be so nearly a determination thereof as
| to be perfectly intelligible.  If for instance instead
| of 'I am' one should say 'I is'.
| 'I is' is in itself meaningless,
| it violates the conditions of its
| relation to the form it is meant
| to embody.  Thus we see that the
| conditions of the relation of the
| first person are the laws of grammar.
|
| I will now take another example.  I know my opinion is false, still I hold it.
| This is grammatical, but the difficulty is that it violates the conditions
| of its having an object.  Observe that this is precisely the difficulty.
| It not only cannot be a determination of this or that object, but it
| cannot be a determination of any object, whatever.  This is the
| whole difficulty.  I say that, I receive contradictories into
| one opinion or symbolical representation;  now this implies
| that it is a symbol of nothing.  Here is another example:
| This very proposition is false.  This is a proposition to
| which the law of excluded middle namely that every symbol
| must be false or true, does not apply.  For if it is false it
| is thereby true.  And if not false it is thereby not true.  Now
| why does not this law apply to this proposition.  Simply because it
| does itself state that it has no object.  It talks of itself and only
| of itself and has no external relation whatever.  These examples show
| that logical laws only hold good, as conditions of a symbol's having
| an object.  The fact that it has often been called the science of
| truth confirms this view.
|
| I define logic therefore as the science of the conditions
| which enable symbols in general to refer to objects.
|
| At the same time 'symbolistic' in general gives a trivium consisting of
| Universal Grammar, Logic, and Universal Rhetoric, using this last term to
| signify the science of the formal conditions of intelligibility of symbols.
|
| CSP, CE 1, pages 174-175.
| 
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lecture I, 1865",
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤