[Arisbe] Re: Inquiry Into Information

[Jon Awbrey]

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Howard Pattee wrote (HP):

HP: I am still behind in your postings of Peirce,
    so maybe some of my questions are already answered.

JA: Logic is a normative science concerned with the form of conduct known as "thinking".
    Maybe it would be slightly better to say "a normative inquiry into thinking conduct".
    A normative inquiry into X is one that goes looking for knowledge about how we ought
    to do X, that is, on the charitable assumption that we care about doing X as well as
    it can be done by creatures such as ourselves. 

HP: I should make it clear that normative principles is not the issue I am worrying about.
    All scientific inquiry, as a process, is normative.  Looking for objective laws is a
    normative activity, since there is no rule that says we must be objective.  Hertz's
    modelling condition is a normative principle.  Invariance (symmetry) principles are
    normative.  Even natural selection is normative.  The issue that interests me is
    what types of normative inquiry into how we think are most likely to uncover
    those non-normative laws of nature that appear to be inexorable and universal?

I do not quite grasp the normativity of all the items on your list,
as I only apply the conception of a norm to voluntary conduct,
but I think that I had better let this one ride for now.

HP: I would call such normative search "heuristics" since the conduct of thought,
    especially in scientific inquiry, must be imaginative and not overly constrained
    by procedural techniques.  I find Peirce's lengthy and complex "logically tight",
    sometimes dogmatic, discussions at odds with the evidence that creative inquiry
    requires riskier thinking, e.g., exhaustive doubt (Descartes), escape from one's
    current abstractions (Whitehead), looking at extremes (Polya), focusing on apparent
    paradox (modern physics), and so on.  It is not that I see anything really wrong with
    what Peirce says.  It is more a question of his relevance to the process of inquiry.
    He has many solutions, but I just don't see his problem.  To change my opinion
    I would need some more evidence that Peirce's logical norms have actually
    resulted in some successful scientific inquiry. 

Okay, I think that I have begun to see how I might have misled you
about the character of Peirce's overall theory of inquiry.  I am
currently focussed on "scientific inquiry", and worse than that,
I have to keep my gnosis to the grindstone of what is likely
to be capable of embodiment in recursive partial functions,
to wit, "computable inquiry", if you will.  Computation is
my medium and I have to respect the grain of that stone.
It need not place any constraint on anybody else, but,
as it turns out, as I have reason to believe that it
shall turn out, there are much closer connections
between the limits of computation and the method
of science, at least, as it gets carried on in
a community of interacting persons who share
a passel of common objectives, or "pragmata".

But that will take us back to Meno
and his whole tribe of Lost Boys,
so maybe I'll pass on that, too.

HP: How symbols in general refer to objects is the most
    difficult conceptual problem of scientific inquiry.

JA: That is why I have been attempting to provide you
    with some of the best available help with the task.

HP: Well, this is just the issue, and in spite of your good intentions, I think you beg it.
    The issue I worry about is whether any of Peirce's norms for inquiry are better than,
    say, Hertz's norm for scientific inquiry.

Based only on Hertz's picture of modeling that you redrew for us,
I would have to say "yes", because Peirce's picture of inquiry
takes in more of the actual landscape and provides a fuller
perspective on all of the other ways that symbolic forms
of representation serve as the catalysts of inquiry
and eventually constitute the products of inquiry.

HP: I am sure Peirce had many great ideas, but do all Peirce disciples
    believe that his norms of inquiry are always some of the best?

I only wish that I could be a good disciple.
Unfortunately, I lack sufficient discipline.

All that aside, I have trouble understanding the question,
because I do not see that there is any sort of competition.
Peirce is only trying to analyze, to detect, to reconstruct,
or to reveal the relevant forms, invariants, patterns, shapes,
structures, whatever, that are embodied in what all inquirers
are always doing all the time.  This almost sounds descriptive,
but it is a description of deliberate, normed, purposeful conduct,
that is intended to serve the improvement of that form of conduct.
Since an inquiry into inquiry really is, ab initio, just another
inquiry, the hypotheses that arise in it are evaluated in all
of the usual ways.

HP: I'm afraid we probably have irremediable differences of opinions on
    whether his logics are a help or a hindrance in scientific inquiry.
    Perhaps my problem is that he has too many distinguished and successful
    competitors.  Where does Peirce think they go wrong?  I would like to
    know how you conclude that Peirce's logical norms are some of the best
    for scientific inquiry?  Was this a higher level normative conclusion
    or do you have some empirical evidence from your own particular area
    of inquiry?

The history of how I came to trust this particular "form of reconstruction" (FOR)
is complex, and maybe not to the purpose.  I used to think that I knew a lot about
how the mind works, even how to build a model of one, right up until I got down to
implementing my initial ideas into computational form.  Thinks changed after that!
Mostly, Peirce's description is the only one I know that has even a minimal regard
for the complexity of the subject, or that supplies enough detail to get down to
silicon tacks.

Speaking of tacks, let me put a pin here to remind me that
I owe you a better account of the broader story of inquiry.

Jon Awbrey

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