[Arisbe] Re: Logic As Semiotic
Jon Awbrey
arisbe@stderr.org
Mon, 27 Aug 2001 12:00:51 -0400
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This text picks up from the point where I went tangential,
a while ago under the "Determination" heading, at Note 19:
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02673.html
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02706.html
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03172.html
| Finally, these principles as principles applying not to this or that
| symbol, form, thing, but to all equally, must be universal. And as
| grounds of possibility they must state what is possible. Now what
| is the universal principle of the possible symbolization of symbols?
| It is that all symbols are symbolizable. And the other principles
| must predicate the same thing of forms and things.
|
| These, then, are the three principles of inference. Our next business is
| to demonstrate their truth. But before doing so, let me repeat that these
| principles do not serve to prove that the kinds of inference are valid, since
| their own proof, on the contrary, must rest on the assumption of that validity.
| Their use is only to show what the condition of that validity is. Hence, the
| only proof of the truth of these principles is this; to show, that if these
| principles be admitted as sufficient, and if the validity of the several kinds
| of inference be also admitted, that then the truth of these principles follows
| by the respective kinds of inference which each establishes.
|
| CSP, CE 1, pages 184-185.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
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