[Arisbe] Re: Inquiry Into Models

[Jon Awbrey]

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Sungchul Ji wrote (SJ):
Jon Awbrey wrote (JA):

SJ: Dear Howard, I have been enjoying and learning a lot from your passionate
    dialogue with Jon these several weeks, and I hope you will continue.

SJ: For now, I have a question for you.  What is the essential difference,
    if any, between the Hertz's and Rosen's theories of modeling?  If they
    are different in some essential ways, what was the influence, if any,
    of Hertz's theory on Rosen's?

JA: Sorry to break in -- I am still behind in my homework on Rosen, so I promise that
    I will quickly retire to the peanut gallery with respect to that side of the issue --
    but there is a generic component of this question that I have worried about since
    I first woke up one fine or fuzzy day in one of my old phil or phys or psy classes
    and started to think seriously about causality, and since I have already tried to
    air my worries about this several times in this forum already, I feel entitled to
    keep on pestering folks about it until I arrive at a measure of satisfaction.

JA: Let me express it, this time around, in the form of a very old question:

JA: "Does not the effect imply its causes?"

SJ: My naive answer would be: 

SJ: If Y is the effect of X, then one can say that X causes Y,
    according to the common usages of terms, 'effect' and 'cause'
    in English language.

SJ: Apparently there are many theories about "cause",
    "causation", or "causality", including regularity
    (or nomological) analysis, counterfactual analysis,
    manipulation analysis, and the probabilistic analysis.
    Probably all of these and more apply to the meaning
    of "causal entailment" that Rosen's modeling diagram
    refers to, but the regularity theory of causation may
    cover most of what Rosen meant by causality.

JA: But maybe I can try to rephrase my question better this way: 

JA: Let Prop(A) be the proposition that event A has happened. 
    And suppose that all of the appurtenant circumstances are 
    appropriate for it to be true that event C causes event E. 

JA: Then let me essay to ask my question this way: 
    Using your common sense understanding or your 
    own favorite definition of "cause and effect", 
    would you call the following a true statement? 

JA: 1. Prop(E) => Prop(C). 

JA: Paraphrasing: 

JA: 1.  If it is true that the effect has happened 
        then it is true that the cause has happened. 

JA: Would you say that Proposition 1 is true, or 
    would you say that Proposition 1 is false? 

SJ: My answer to this question would depend on the specific 
    nature of the cause (C) and the effects (E) involved.
    In general, it seems to me that Prop(E) => Prop(C)
    would be true only if C is the necessary and
    sufficient condition for E and not otherwise.

Now then, when you speak, in general, of the possibility
that "C is the necessary and sufficient condition for E",
do you mean "necessary and sufficient casual condition" or
do you mean "necessary and sufficient logical condition"?

Jon Awbrey

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