[Arisbe] Re: Inquiry Into Inquiry

[Jon Awbrey]

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Howard Pattee wrote (HP):
Jon Awbrey wrote (JA):

HP: Our discussion appears to be diverging, so let me try to refocus my problem.
    You are working on inquiry.  This is a big word.  I would say you can inquire
    about anything imaginable, but I am assuming you are focusing on what we call
    scientific inquiry, since I thought that was Peirce's focus.  What I am trying
    to discern is what is fundamentally different in Peirce's (and your own view)
    of scientific inquiry from a typical physicist's (e.g., Hertz's) view.

Ok, let me see if I can restate the focus that I will be
trying to maintain over the next academic year, at least.

| Inquiry Driven Systems:  An Inquiry Into Inquiry
|
| Contact:  Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
| Version:  Draft 8.4
| Created:  23 Jun 1996
| Revised:  04 Jun 2001
| Advisor:  M.A. Zohdy
| Faculty:  Lipman, Mili, Windeknecht
| Setting:  Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan
| Excerpt:  Section 1.1.1  "Problem"
|
| 1.  Research Proposal
|
| 1.1  Outline of the Project:  Inquiry Driven Systems
|
| 1.1.1  Problem
|
| This research is oriented toward a single problem:  What is the nature of inquiry?
| I intend to address crucial questions about the operation, the organization, and
| the computational facilitation of inquiry, taking inquiry to encompass the general
| trend of all forms of reasoning that lead to the features of scientific investigation
| as their ultimate development.

Now, it took me three of four drafts of my dissertation proposal to get this one little
paragraph written as it is, so I know that I must have put a modicum of thought into it.

I think of "inquiry" as naming a generic class of "forms of conduct" (FOC's).
The species that many of us call "scientific inquiry" is perhaps the current
paragon of this genus, but that does not mean that its evolution is complete.

How might it be possible for us to improve our ability to do the best sorts of inquiry?
Hint:  People frequently mention the importance of "organa" (instruments) for science.
Years ago, all too many years ago, I pursued this question under the banner and the
charge of building an "Intelliscope" for inquiry, an instrument to augment, extend,
leverage, and magnify our powers to carry out effective inquiries in optimal ways.

And it still sounds like a good plan to me.

But what would it take to build such an instrument?

AI, there's the rub.

The only kind of AI worth having, from my POV.

At present I do not understand some of the distinctions that you draw,
and this makes it difficult for me to chart my course in relation to
your coordinate system.  I do not understand the contrasts that you
draw between "physicist" and "pragmatist", "logic" and "math", and
I do have much feeling for the way that you appear to be employing
the contrast between "formal" and "material"(?).  I realize that
these words are sometimes used as labels for bits of turf, but
I no longer have much stake in that.  So I think it might help
to reach an understanding on the use of these axes before we
attempt to plot our explorations any further into this space.

HP: Specifically, in the previous post, I asked whether Peircean logic is formal.
    You sound like the sign relation is entirely formal:

    | JA: A sign relation L is a SET of 3-tuples of the form <o, s, i>,
    |     where o is an element of the set O, called the "object domain",
    |     where s is an element of the set S, called the "sign domain", and
    |     where i is an element of the set I, called the "interpretant domain".
    |
    | JA: In other words, a sign relation L is a SUBSET of the cartesian product OxSxI,
    | a circumstance that Asciians write as "L c OxSxI".

HP: You also sound like Peirce's "correspondence" is also formal, in which case the
    sign relation would not in itself be an adequate model of scientific inquiry.
    That is, as a formal system, it does not address the problem of observation
    and measurement.

I guess I just do not understand the use of the word "formal"
as you appear to be using it in several of the above statements.
I grasp "formal" as meaning something like "concerned with form"
or "pertaining to form".  To my way of thinking, this contains
no implication of "being limited exclusively to form", since
form and matter are just two diverse aspects of being.

JA: To make a long story short, what Peirce means by "correspondence"
    in this definition is just the whole 3-adic sign relation itself,
    which he occasionally describes as a "triple correspondence".

HP: But then the last sentence sounds like this formal system is intended
    as an alternate to a theory of truth often used in science:

JA: He does not mean to suggest any sort of pallid 2-adic "imaging" or "mirrortying"
    as implicated in a "correspondence notion of truth".

As I understand it, a notion of truth is ever contained within
and never makes sense beyond the bounds of a notion of inquiry.

HP: The Hertz's modelling relation is instructive because:

HP: (1) it clearly separates the formal logical syntax of our models (laws)
        from the empirical observational semantics (initial conditions),
        which is essential for physics, and

HP: (2) it emphasizes the limits of scientific knowledge:
        "We do not know, nor have we any means of knowing,
        whether our conception of things are in conformity
        with [external reality] in any other than this one
        fundamental respect."

HP: So, to restate my main question:

HP: Does Peircean inquiry strictly separate
    the logical syntax of signs from
    the semantics of observation?

I do not know what you mean by "strictly separate" in this context.
I understand the relations among objects, signs, and ideas to make
sense only within the context of one or another 3-adic sign relation.
I've been told that Peirce seldom if ever used the term "semantics" --
no matter, he recognized the denotative or the referential relation
of signs and ideas to actual, imaginary, or intentional objects,
so that is what we may call his sense of "semantics".  Are you
asking whether objects and signs, as absolute categories, are
mutually exclusive?

Jon Awbrey

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